Abstract. An interactive proof system (or argument) (P;V ) is concurrent zero-knowledge if whenever the prover engages in polynomially many concurrent executions of (P;V ), with (possibly distinct) colluding polynomial time bounded veri ers V1; : : : ; V poly(n) , the entire undertaking is zero-knowledge. Dwork, Naor, and Sahai recently showed the existence of a large class of concurrent zero-knowledge arguments, including arguments for all of NP, under a reasonable assumption on the behavior of clocks of nonfaulty processors. In this paper, we continue the study of concurrent zero-knowledge arguments. After observing that, without recourse to timing, the existence of a trusted center considerably simplies the design and proof of many concurrent zero-knowledge arguments (again including arguments for all of NP), we design a preprocessing protocol, making use of timing, to simulate the trusted center for the purposes of achieving concurrent zero-knowledge. Once a particular prover and veri er have executed the preprocessing protocol, any polynomial number of subsequent executions of a rich class of protocols will be concurrent zero-knowledge.
Introduction
In order to be useful in the real world, cryptographic primitives and protocols must remain secure even when executed concurrently with other arbitrarily chosen protocols, run by arbitrarily chosen parties, whose identities, goals, or even existence may not be known. Indeed, this setting, characterized in 13] as a distributed computing aggregate, describes the Internet. Electronic interactions over an aggregate, such as economic transactions, transmission of medical data, data storage, and telecommuting, pose security risks inadequately addressed in computer science research. In particular, the issue of the security of concurrent executions is often 1 ignored.
A zero-knowledge protocol is supposed to ensure that no information is leaked during its execution. However, when zero knowledge interactions are executed concurrently both parties can be at risk. Consider the case of zero knowledge proofs: the veri er faces the possibility that the prover with which it is interacting is actually using some concurrently running second interaction as an \oracle" to help answer the veri er's queries { this is the classical chess master's problem. In the case of a proof of knowledge, the interaction may not actually yield a proof. This is an issue of potential malleability of the interactive proof system, and is addressed in 13] . In contrast, the prover faces the risk that concurrent executions of a protocol with many veri ers may leak information and may not be zero-knowledge in toto. In this case the interaction remains a proof but may fail to remain zero knowledge. This issue was rst addressed in 16]. To overcome this di culty, 16] introduce the notion of an ( ; ) constraint for some : For any two (possibly the same) non-faulty processors P 1 and P 2 , if P 1 measures elapsed time on its local clock and P 2 measures elapsed time on its local clock, and P 2 begins its measurement in real time no sooner than P 1 begins, then P 2 will nish after P 1 does.
As 16] points out, an ( ; ) constraint is implicit in most reasonable assumptions on the behavior of clocks in a distributed system (e.g., the linear drift assumption). According to the (standard) view that process clocks are under the control of an adversarial scheduler, the ( ; ) constraint limits the choices of the adversary to schedules that satisfy the constraints.
Under an ( ; ) constraint, 16] shows that there exist constant round concurrent zero-knowledge protocols of various kinds, for example, arguments for any language in NP 2 . In the protocols of 16], processors make explicit use of their local clocks in order to achieve concurrent zero-knowledge. The protocols require that certain timing constraints be met, which limit the kinds of protocol interleavings that can occur.
Our Contribution. In this work, we reduce the need for timing in achieving concurrent zero-knowledge. Speci cally, for a rich class of interactive protocols, we are able push all use of timing into a constant round preprocessing phase; furthermore, the real time at which the preprocessing phase between a prover P and veri er V 1 occurs need not have any relation to the real time when P and a di erent veri er V 2 execute the preprocessing. After this preprocessing phase, the prover and the veri er can execute any polynomial number of a rich class of protocols without any further timing constraints, and the whole interaction will be concurrent zero-knowledge. We require the existence of a semantically secure public-key encryption scheme.
By limiting the use of timing to a single initial phase for each (P; V ) pair, our methods can reduce the real execution time of protocols. This is because once preprocessing completes the parties never deliberately introduce timing delays in executing steps of future protocols. In contrast, in the protocols of 16] such deliberate delays play a critical role. For many applications, where two parties 2 under verious standard computational assumptions will be executing many zero-knowledge protocols, such as authentication with a system, these repeated delays may be expensive. Moreover, as we will see, our approach frequently yields simpler protocols that are easier to prove concurrent zero-knowledge.
Colluding Veri ers interacting with the Prover V 1 V 2 : : : V n Step 1
Step 2
Step 1
Step 2 . . .
Step 3
Step 4 . . .
Step 4
Step 4 Diagram 1. A troublesome interleaving for concurrent zero-knowledge.
Interleavings of Protocols. The di culty in achieving concurrent zero-knowledge is due to the existence of certain \bad" interleavings of concurrently executing protocols. The bad interleavings revolve around the di culty of simulating a transcript of multiple concurrent interactions (recall that the ability to simulate an interaction is the core of the de nition of zero-knowledge). Consider the standard (computational) zero-knowledge protocol for 3-colorability 3 22], which can be based on any information-theoretic commitment scheme.
Generic Zero-Knowledge Argument for 3-Colorability: 1) V ?! P : Information-theoretic commitment to queries. 2) P ?! V : Commitment to graphs and colorings. 3) V ?! P : Open queries. 4) P ?! V : Open queried graphs or colorings, which V then checks are valid.
The standard simulator, having access only to V , produces transcripts of this protocol as follows. First, it receives V 's commitment in Step 1. Then, supplying V initially with \garbage" in Step 2, the simulator discovers the queries V committed to through V 's Step 3 response. The simulator uses this knowledge to construct graphs and colorings which would fool these particular queries. Then the simulator \rewinds" the interaction to just after Step 1, and supplies V with a commitment to these new graphs and colorings in Step 2. Since V is already committed by Step 1, its Step 3 response cannot change. Thus, the simulator can open the graphs and colorings according to the queries, and V will accept.
This simulator fails in the context of concurrent interactions because of the rewinding. Consider the following interleaving of n colluding veri ers following the generic four-round protocol described above.
An adversary controlling the veri ers can arrange that the Step 1 commitments to queries made by veri ers V i+1 ; : : :; V n can depend on messages sent by the prover in Step 2 of its interaction with V i . It is a well-known open problem how to simulate transcripts with this interleaving in polynomial time; the diculty with the straightforward approach is that once the queries in the interaction with V i are opened (in Step 3), it becomes necessary to re-simulate Step 2 of the interaction with V i , and therefore the entire simulation of the interaction with veri ers V i+1 ; : : :; V n must be re-simulated. The most deeply nested transaction, with V n , is simulated roughly 2 n times.
Remark on Commitment Schemes The literature discusses two types of bit or string commitment: computational and information-theoretic. In computational string commitment there is only one possible way of opening the commitment. Such a scheme is designed to be secure against a probabilistic polynomial time receiver and an arbitrarily powerful sender. In information theoretic commitment it is possible to open the commitment in two ways, but the assumed computational boundedness of the sender prevents him from nding a second way. Such a scheme is designed to be secure against an arbitrarily powerful receiver and a probabilistic polynomial time prover. See 13] for a formal de nition of computational commitment.
The commitments in Step 1 of the generic zero-knowledge argument must be information-theoretic, meaning that information theoretically nothing is leaked about the committed values. This is for soundness, rather than for zero-knowledge. Our techniques require that the veri er only use computational commitments (for example, as in the 6-round zero-knowledgeargument for NP of Feige and Shamir 19], which we modify for technical reasons).
The Trusted Center Model. Consider a model in which a trusted center gives out signed public key, private key pairs (E; D) of some public key cryptosystem to every user over a secure private channel. As we now explain, in this model arguments such as the one given in 19] can be simulated without rewinding, provided that the commitments by V are performed using the public key E given to it by the trusted center. This is signi cant because, if there is no rewinding, then interleavings such as the one described above are not problematic.
The simulator for V simulates its interaction with the trusted center as well as with P. So, the simulator knows the private key D corresponding to the public key E used in V 's commitments. Hence, the simulator never has to rewind to learn a committed value. We call such simulations, in which rewinding is avoided, straight-line 4 . In the case of straight-line zero-knowledge protocols, it is clear that concurrent interactions pose no threat to simulability, since the simulator can simulate each interaction independently in a straight-line fashion. This trusted center model is extremely powerful, and a great many standard protocols become straight-line zero-knowledge, and hence concurrent zero-knowledge, in the trusted center model with only minor modi cations. For example, aside from arguments for NP, we also exhibit natural protocols for deniable message authentication and coin ipping.
Although straight-line zero-knowledge implies concurrent zero-knowledge without any timing constraints in the trusted center model, the notion of a trusted center that knows everyone's private keys and communicates over secure channels is undesirable or infeasible in many contexts. The preprocessing protocol of Section 4 uses timing to permit P and V to agree on a key E V for V to use for commitments in their future interactions. Intuitively, the interaction ensures (with overwhelming probability) that V (perhaps with the collusion of other veriers, but with absolutely no help from P), \knows" the corresponding decryption key D V . Formally, the preprocessing protocol will ensure that subsequent interactions between P and V that would have been straight-line zero-knowledge in the trusted center model, are actually straight-line zero-knowledge in the conventional model.
Model and De nitions
Timing. We assume that all parties in any interaction have access to local clocks.
Furthermore, as proposed in 16], we assume that there are known constants and , for which the following ( ; ) constraint holds: For any two (possibly the same) non-faulty processors P 1 and P 2 , if P 1 measures elapsed time on its local clock and P 2 measures elapsed time on its local clock, vand P 2 begins its measurement in real time no sooner than P 1 begins, then P 2 will nish after P 1 does.
Zero-Knowledge and Concurrent Zero-Knowledge. In the original \black box" forumulation of zero-knowledge proof systems 24], an interactive proof system (P; V ) for a language L is computational (or perfect) zero-knowledge if there exists a probabilistic, expected polynomial time oracle machine S, called the simulator, such that for every probabilistic polynomial time veri er strategy V , the distributions (P; V )(x) and S V (x) are computationally indistinguishable (or identical) whenever x 2 L. Here, formally, the machine V is assumed to take as input a partial conversation transcript, along with a random tape, and output the veri er's next response. This de ntion also holds in the case of arguments 7], or computationally-sound proofs, where the prover and veri er are both probabilistic polynomial time machines.
Following 16], to investigate preservation of zero-knowledge in a distributed setting, we consider a probabilistic polynomialtime adversary that controls many veri ers simultaneously. Here, we consider an adversary A that takes as input a partial conversation transcript of a prover interacting with several veri ers concurrently, where the transcript includes the local times on the prover's clock when each message was sent or received by the prover. The output of A will either be a tuple ( receive; V; ; t), indicating that P receives message from V at time t on P's local clock, or ( send; V; t), indicating that P must send a message to V at time t on P's local clock. The adversary must output a local time for P that is greater than all the times given in the transcript that was input to A (the adversary cannot rewind P), and standard well-formedness conditions must apply. If these conditions are not met, this corresponds to a non-real situation, so such transcripts are simply discarded. Note that we assume that if the adversary speci es a response time t for the prover that violates a timing constraint of the protocol with V , the prover should answer with a special null response which invalidates the remainder of the conversation with veri er V . The distribution of transcripts generated by an adversary A interacting with a prover P on common input x is denoted (P $ A)(x).
We say an argument or proof system (P; V ) for a language L is computational (or perfect) concurrent zero-knowledge if there exists a probabilistic, expected polynomial time oracle machine S such that for every probabilistic polynomial time adversary A, the distributions (P $ A)(x) and S A (x) are computationally indistinguishable (or identical) whenever x 2 L.
Note that since we assume that the prover acts honestly and follows the protocol, it does not matter if there is a single entity that is acting as the prover for all veri ers, or if there are many entities that are acting as provers for subsets of the veri ers, since the actions of the provers would be the same, and in our model, the timing of events is controlled by the adversary.
NIZK. Some of our protocols make use of non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof constructions 5,20,2,4] for languages in NP. Note, however, that although typically one considers NIZK in a model where all parties share a public random string, we do not make any such assumptions in any model we consider. In a NIZK proof, the prover P and veri er V have a common input x and also share a random string , called the reference string, of length polynomial in the length of x. The prover wishes to convince the veri er of the membership of x in some xed NP language L. To this end, the prover is allowed to send the veri er a single message m = P(x; ), computed (probabilistically) as a function of x, . The probabilistic polynomial time veri er must decide whether or not to accept as a function of x, , and m. Such an interaction (P; V ) is an NIZK proof system for L if: (1) If x 2 L, for all , (P; V )(x; ) accepts. (2) If x = 2 L, for all P , the probability over and the random coins of P and V that (P ; V )(x; ) accepts is negligible. (3) There exists a probabilistic polynomial time simulator S such that, if x 2 L, then the distributions S(x) and ( ; P(x; )), where in the latter distribution is chosen uniformly, are computationally indistinguishable. We further ask that the prover be probabilistic polynomial time, but also allow that in the case when x 2 L, the prover is given a witness w for the membership of x 2 L. We require, however, that the distribution ( ; P(x; ; w)) be computationally indistinguishable from S(x) no matter how the witness w is chosen. 20, 2] show that such NIZK proof systems with e cient provers exist for every language in NP assuming trapdoor permutations exist. Note that the de nition above gives \bounded" NIZK proof systems, i.e., a given reference string can be used to prove only one NP statement. We also require unbounded NIZK proof systems, in which any polynomial number of NP statements can be proven in zero-knowledge using the same reference string . 12, 20] have shown that the existence of a bounded NIZK proof system for an NP-complete language L with an e cient prover implies the existence of unbounded NIZK proof systems with e cient provers for any language in NP. A precise de nition of unbounded NIZK can be found in 2, 4, 20] .
Note that NIZK proofs are truly non-interactive only if the prover and the veri er already agree on a random string , which we do not assume. Furthermore, if the distribution of is far from uniform, then the zero-knowledge condition fails to hold. This issue motivates our concurrently simulable random selection protocol, described below.
Assumptions. We require a probabilistic public key cryptosystem that is semantically secure 23]. The encryptions must be uniquely decodable (so the scheme must be undeniable 9]). We will use the public key cryptosystem for computationally secure string commitment as follows: V uses an encryption key E to commit to a string s by simply sending an encryption e of s using a random string r. To open s, V sends s; r; the receiver checks that e = E(s; r).
Straight-Line Zero-Knowledge in
The Trusted Center Model
In order to de ne the class of protocols for which our construction applies, we consider a trusted center model, in which the trusted center communicates to each participant a public key, private key pair (E; D) for a public key cryptosystem, over a secure private channel. More formally, we assume the existence of a trusted center with which any party can interact using a secure private channel. In our model, before any protocol (P; V ) begins, rst V receives a public key and private key pair (E; D) from the trusted center over a secure channel, whereas P receives only E from the trusted center. Then the interaction takes place as in the normal model. Also in our trusted center model, we modify the de nition of zero-knowledge to require the simulator to also simulate the interaction with the trusted center, which in particular means that the simulator produces the public key E and private key D given to any veri er. We use the trusted center model only for de nitional purposes; our protocols do not assume a trusted center. In particular, we will de ne the class of protocols that are straight-line zero-knowledge in the trusted center model and argue that any protocol in this class is concurrent zero-knowledge. We will show that this class is rich, and, in the next section, show how to use timing to replace the role of the trusted center by means of a preprocessing phase.
As noted above, the trusted center model is extremely powerful; in particular, in this model Racko and Simon were able to de ne and construct noninteractive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge 27]. These noninteractive proofs could then be used to prove \plaintext awareness" of encrypted messages (intuitively, that the sender \knows" what he is sending), resulting in a cryptosystem secure against the most general chosen ciphertext attacks (called chosen ciphertext in the post-processing mode in 13]; the construction of the cryptosystem in 27] also requires the trusted center to establish a digital signature scheme). This is equivalent to non-malleable security against a post-processing chosen ciphertext attack 13].
The trusted center model also proves useful in the context of concurrent zero-knowledge. In particular, if the protocol requires that commitments be made using the key E chosen by the trusted center, then the construction of concurrent zero-knowledge protocols becomes a simpler task: the simulator simulates each party's interaction with the trusted center, and hence knows the secret key D for each public key E later used in the protocol.
We will prove concurrent zero-knowledge in the trusted center model by establishing an even stronger property, straight-line zero-knowledge. Intuitively, a protocol is straight-line zero-knowledge if there exists a simulator that does no \re-winding" in order to produce its transcript. Formally, a zero-knowledge interactive protocol (P; V ) is straight-line zero-knowledge if the simulator S for the protocol is of a special form. Recall S is in general an expected polynomial time machine that uses a veri er strategy V as an oracle, giving it partial transcripts and obtaining the veri er's next message as its response. De ne O(S V (x; r)) = (q 1 ; q 2 ; : : :; q m ) to be the ordered sequence of oracle queries (partial transcripts) given by S to V , on input x and using random bits r. We require for every V , x, and r, letting O(S V (x; r)) = (q 1 ; q 2 ; : : :; q m ), that the transcript q i is a pre x of q i+1 for 1 i m ? 1. Such a simulator S is called a straight-line simulator.
It is immediate that a straight-line zero-knowledge protocol is also concurrent zero-knowledge, since interaction with many veri ers simultaneously can be simulated by simply simulating the interaction with each veri er separately using the straight-line simulator.
Note that, in the conventional framework for zero-knowledge proofs, straightline zero-knowledge proofs can only exist for languages in BPP, since the polynomial time simulator can act as the prover. In the trusted center model, this need not concern us, since the real prover cannot impersonate the trusted center, whereas the simulator can.
Examples
The class of protocols with straight-line simulators in the trusted center model is rich.
Generic NP. The generic argument for membership in an NP language, described in Section 1 requires information-theoretic commitments on the part of the veri er, and therefore does not t our model. The 6-round protocol of Feige and Shamir 19], which can be based on any one-way function, can be modi ed to be straight-line zero-knowledge in the trusted center model provided that the veri er's commitments are made using the key received from the trusted center. The modi cation involves using an information-theoretic commitment scheme for an additional initial commitment by the prover (details are omitted for lack of space). Thus, there is a constant round straight-line zero-knowledge argument in the trusted center model for every language in NP based only on the existence of semantically secure public-key encryption and information-theoretic commitment schemes. However, there is a simpler, four round scheme, based on the existence of trapdoor permutations, which we present below.
Random String Selection. We next describe a random string selection (coinipping) protocol, by which two parties P and V can select a random string which will be random as long as one of the parties is honest. The random selection protocol has the following extremely useful property: in the trusted center model, the simulator can force any desired string as the outcome of the protocol; moreover, the distribution of simulated transcripts is identical to the distribution on actual transcripts, conditioned on any given output. In the sequel, let E denote the public key assigned to the veri er by the trusted center. The natural cryptographic protocol for random selection of strings of length k, due to 3], can be made straight-line simulable as follows 5 : 1) V ?! P : E(r V ) : r V 2 R f0; 1g k 2) P ?! V : r P : r P 2 R f0; 1g k 3) V ?! P : Reveal coins used to generate E(r V ).
The output of the protocol is r V r P .
Since E(r V ) is a computationally secret commitment to any party that does not know D, it is clear that this protocol achieves the desired random selection properties. Here, the simulator, on input x 2 f0; 1g k , (after having simulated the trusted center, i.e., having supplied V with a public key, private key pair (E; D)), receives the veri er's Step 1 message. Using D, it recovers r V . The simulator then supplies V with the Step 2 message x r V . In Step 3, V must decommit to r V , and so the output of the protocol is x. If the input x is chosen uniformly at random, then the simulator's Step 2 message, x r V will also be uniformly random. Hence, the simulator's distribution will actually be identical to the distribution of actual transcripts.
Alternative NP. We can use the random string selection protocol to give a 4-round alternative to the straight-line zero-knowledge argument system for NP that is also straight-line zero-knowledge in the trusted center model, if we make the stronger assumption that trapdoor permutations exist. By 20,2], assuming trapdoor permutations exist, there are e cient prover NIZK proofs for NP. Recall that NIZK proofs require a random string to be shared by the parties P and V . We will use the random selection protocol above to select this shared randomness. The following protocol is therefore an argument proving x 2 L for any language L 2 NP: 1) V ?! P : E(r V ) : r V 2 R f0; 1g poly(jxj) 2) P ?! V : r P : r P 2 R f0; 1g poly(jxj) 3) V ?! P : Reveal coins used to generate E(r V ). 4) P ?! V : NIZK proof that x 2 L using reference string = r V r P .
Note that Step 4 can later be repeated any (polynomial) number of times to prove di erent statements in NP once the reference string has been established (using an unbounded NIZK proof system such as the one given in 20]).
A straight-line simulator proceeds as follows. First, it calls the simulator S NIZK (x) of the NIZK proof system, which produces a reference string and an NIZK proof p. The straight-line simulator given above for the random selection protocol is then invoked to produce a transcript for Steps 1-3 that force r V r P = . The simulator then outputs p as the prover's Step 4 message, and terminates the simulation. Since the distribution S NIZK (x) is computationally indistinguishable from the distribution ( ; p) where is truly random, and p is generated by the NIZK prover's algorithm, we have that the distribution of our straight-line simulator will be computationally indistinguishable from the distribution of actual conversation transcripts of this protocol.
Deniable Message Authentication. NIZK proofs can also be useful for constructing straight-line zero-knowledge protocols for other applications. Consider the problem of deniable message authentication 13, 15, 16] . Here, the prover wishes to authenticate a message m to the veri er, in such a way that no other party can verify the authentication. In particular, we require that veri ers cannot prove to anyone else that the prover authenticated m. It su ces that the protocol be concurrent zero-knowledge, since if the veri ers could generate the transcript of their conversations with the prover on their own, then certainly it will not be possible to prove that the prover authenticated m to any other party. We exhibit a very natural protocol for this task, with a slight modi cation to make it straight-line zero-knowledge. For this protocol, we will require a non-malleable public key encryption scheme. Note that the encryption scheme must be non-malleable in the conventional model, not just in the trusted center model! Let the prover's public non-malleable encryption key be E P , for which it alone knows the private key. 1) V ?! P : E(r V ), where r V 2 R f0; 1g poly(jxj) 2) P ?! V : r P , where r P 2 R f0; 1g poly(jxj) 3) V ?! P : Reveal coins used to generate E(r V ). Choose r 2 R f0; 1g k .
Send E P (m r), y = E(r), and an NIZK proof that the two encryptions sent are consistent with some r 2 f0; 1g k using reference string = r V r P .
4) P ?! V : r
Note that the rst two steps can be omitted if there is some other source of a random string to use as the reference string for the NIZK proof. Such a string could, for example, be found as part of the public key for the prover's encryption scheme, as it is in the construction of 13]. The straight-line simulator simulates the rst 2 steps trivially. In Step 3, after checking the NIZK, the simulator uses D to decrypt y, yielding r S . Note that if the NIZK proof was accepted, then the decryption will correctly give r S = r with all but negligible probability. Hence, the simulator simply outputs r S as the prover's nal message, and terminates. The simulator will thus fail with no more than a negligible probability.
These examples illustrate not only that the class of straight-line zero-knowledge protocols in the trusted center model is rich, but also that it is not di cult to construct proofs that t this de nition. In the next section, we show how to eliminate the trusted center for the purpose of concurrent zero-knowledge using a preprocessing protocol based on timing constraints.
The Preprocessing Protocol
In this section, we show how to how to achieve concurrent zero-knowledge without the trusted center for all protocols that are straight-line zero-knowledge in the trusted center model. This is accomplished by replacing the trusted center with a preprocessing protocol that employs timing constraints. This eliminates the trusted center for the purpose of maintaining concurrent zero-knowledge.
Let G be the generator for a public-key cryptosystem which requires`(n) random bits. We will write G(1 n ; ) = (E; D) to mean that G, when given security parameter n and random bits 2 f0; 1g`( n) , produces the public encryption .
4. V ! P : Veri er gives a ZK argument (e.g. 19]) of consistency of the Step 1-3 messages above with some such that G(1 n ; ) produces E.
P ?! V : If
Step 4 is accepted, send \READY."
Timing Constraints: (1) P requires the Step 3 message to be received before time has elapsed on its local clock since the Step 1 message was sent. If a veri er V fails to respond in this allotted time, we say V has timed out. (2) P does not send the Step 5 signal until time has elapsed on its local clock since Step 1.
For zero-knowledge, we assume that the adversary is constrained by an ( ; )-constraint. For completeness we must also assume that V can send its Step 3 message in the real time required for time to elapse on P's local clock.
The following theorem shows that these timing constraints e ectively eliminate all problematic interleavings. Theorem 1. Assuming that a semantically secure public-key cryptosystem exists, the Preprocessing Protocol, followed by any polynomial number of protocols that are straight-line zero-knowledge in the trusted center model, is (computational) concurrent zero-knowledge.
Furthermore, using the Preprocessing Protocol does not give the Prover any advantage it would not have in the original protocol. In particular, using the Preprocessing Protocol does not endanger the soundness of any protocol that was sound in the trusted center model. Theorem 2. Let = (P; V ) be any protocol in the trusted center model, and let 0 = (P 0 ; V 0 ) be the Preprocessing Protocol followed by in the normal model. Then, for any probabilistic polynomial time prover P , there exists another prover P such that the distribution of transcripts from (P ; V 0 ) (not including the transcript of the Preprocessing Protocol) is computationally indistinguishable from the distribution of transcripts from (P ; V ) (not including the initial interaction with the trusted center).
Proof (of Theorem 2). Theorem 2 follows from the fact that the veri er's role in the Preprocessing Protocol is simulable without knowing D or a such that G(1 n ; ) = (E; D). P behaves as follows: First it simulates the Preprocessingprotocol with P , and then it simply behaves as P does afterwards.
From the trusted center, it rst receives E. Then it generates random strings , r . Note that all this time had absolutely nothing to do with E. However, by the zero-knowledge property of the argument of Step 4, P can simulate Step 4 as if G(1 n ; ) = (E; D). By this zero-knowledge condition, the transcript of all steps so far is computationally indistinguishable from a partial transcript of a real interaction of V 0 and P . Since the state of P at the end of Step 4 (i.e. the beginning of ) is computationally indistinguishable from its state at this point in a real interaction with V 0 , the theorem follows.
Proof (of Theorem 1, using the proof techniques of 16].). First, we observe that the timing constraints yield the following interleaving contraint:
Interleaving Constraint: While any veri er is in Steps 1-3 and has not timed out, no new interaction can be started and complete Step 5. Note that this remains true by the ( ; )-constraint even if there are many provers with di erent local clocks, since the time between Steps 1-3 must always be less in real time than the minimum delay in real time between Steps 1-5.
Note also that in all steps the prover needs no special information to carry out her side of the protocol. Hence, for any particular veri er, all steps in the Preprocessing protocol are trivial to simulate (perfectly) in a straight-line fashion. To be able to simulate any subsequent protocol that is straight-line zero-knowledge in the trusted center model, we appeal to the following Lemma: If not, for any future simulation of V , when the simulator obtains a Step 3 response from V , it again checks with the responses it already has to see if this new response will yield a valid secret key for V . If this is not the case, then the simulator has proof that is inconsistent with the commitments in V 's Step 1 message. Hence with all but negligible probability, V will not pass Step 4 of the protocol, by the soundness of the ZK Argument. Note that the soundness condition for ZK Arguments requires that no PPT prover can succeed in proving a false statement with more than negligible probability. The interaction of the PPT A and the PPT simulator together certainly still comprise a PPT system, and hence cannot prove the false statement with more than negligible probability. Thus with all but negligible probability, V never makes it past Step 4, and the Lemma follows.
We now describle a subroutine of the simulator called Extract. The subroutine takes two arguments, the name of a veri er V i , and a partial starting transcript T that includes the Step 1 message of V i . Extract(V i ,T ) is only called if the simulator already has obtained one Step 3 response from V i . The purpose of calling Extract on V i is to create for V i the situation required by the Lemma.
In Extract(V i ,T ) the simulator repeats the following procedure as many times as needed to obtain another Step 3 response from V .
{ Starting with partial transcript T, begin a simulation until either V i gives a
Step 3 response or more than time has passed since Step 1 of V i . During this simulation:
For any veri ers introduced after the Step 1 message of V i , by the Interleaving Constraint, we know these veri ers will never proceed past Step 5 in the time allotted, so simulate the interaction with them perfectly.
If any veri er V j which was introduced before the Step 1 message of V i gives a Step 3 response: If the simulator has already obtained two Step 3 responses from V j , by the Lemma all interaction with V j can be simulated in a straightline fashion.
If not, the simulator executes Extract(V j ,T ). Thus, we are guaranteed that after executing Extract(V i ; T) we have received two Step 3 responses from V i . If the two responses received are the same, the simulator fails. This can only happen if the random bits chosen by the simulator in Step 2 were identical, an event with exponentially small probability. We will later argue that the simulator is expected polynomial time. Hence the simulator only gets an expected polynomial number of chances to fail in this manner, and so its probability of failure in this way is negligible. If the two
Step 3 responses are di erent, such a veri er that has satis ed the conditions of the Lemma is called neutralized. Now, to generate its output transcript the simulator begins a straight-line simulation with the adversary. Whenever a veri er V that has not already been neutralized gives a Step 3 response, the simlator calls Extract(V; T), where T is the partial transcript up to and including the Step 1 message of V . When Extract terminates, V has been neutralized and thus, by the Lemma, all future interaction with V can be simulated in a straight-line fashion. This continues until the simulation is concluded.
By construction, the distribution of transcripts produced by such a simulation is computationally indistinguishable from those arising from an actual interaction with the adversary, since the transcript is produced in a straight-line manner.
We must con rm that the expected running time of the simulator is polynomially bounded. Each trial within Extract, not counting time taken by recursive function calls, certainly takes polynomial time, say O(n c ). Let us analyze the expected running time of a function call to Extract. Now, conditioned on some partial transcript T, let X i denote the random variable for the time to complete Extract(V i ; T). Let p i denote the probability over simulations starting at T that V i will give its Step 3 response during a simulation trial. If V 1 is the rst veri er appearing in T, then during Extract(V 1 ; T), no recursive calls can be made for other veri ers. Hence, X 1 O(n c )(1+p 1 +(1?p 1 )(1+X 1 )), and so by linearity of expectation, E(X 1 ) O(n c ) pi . Now, in the simulation, conditioned on a partial transcript T, the probability that Extract(V i ; T) will be called (from outside Extract) is exactly p i . Thus, the expected amount of time the simulation will spend on Extract(V i ; T) is O(n c ) 2i. Since this does not depend on T, we can remove the conditioning and conclude that the expected amount of time the simulation will spend in Extract for V i will be O(n c ) 2i. We note that the total number of veri ers that can be present in the nal transcript is bounded by the amount of time the adversary runs for. Hence, if the adversary's expected running time is t(n), the expected amount of time the simulation will spend in Extract for all of the veri ers is O(n c t(n) 2 ). The rest of the simulation will certainly take no more than expected O(n c )t(n) time, and so we conclude that the expected running time is polynomial in n.
Additional Remarks and Future Research
Recently, Kilian, Petrank and Racko 25] have shown that any 4-round nontrivial zero-knowledge interactive proof is not black-box simulatable under concurrent executions. In a companion paper, Richardson and Kilian 28] have shown that for any " > 0 and any upper bound k on the amount of concurrency to be tolerated, there exists a zero-knowledge proof for any language in NP requiring k " messages. We believe that the Kilian-Richardson protocol can be used (with some modi cations) as a preprocessing protocol to allow subsequent constant round concurrent zero-knowledge arguments for any statement in NP; we are in the process of checking the details.
The di culties in achieving non-malleability and concurrent zero knowledge both stem from potentially bad protocol interleavings. In 16] and in the preprocessing protocol described in this paper, timing is used explicitly to proscribe certain interleavings in order to achieve concurrent zero-knowledge. Can timing be used in a natural way to achieve non-malleability? For concreteness, consider non-malleable string commitment. Since non-malleable string commitment protocols exist without recourse to timing 13], any timing-based solution would be interesting only if it is e cient or simple.
Can timing be used to achieve other cryptographic objectives?
